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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a jury verdict finding the Appellant 
guilty of one count of Illegal Possession or Use of a Con-
trolled Substance, a Third Degree Felony after a jury trial 
with the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. The Appellant 
was tried in the First District Court of Box Elder County on 
October 16th, 1998. 
On December 15th, 1998, the Appellant was sentenced to 
serve an indeterminate term of not more than five years. The 
Appellant's sentence is to be served at the Utah State Prison. 
It was ordered that this term run concurrent to any prison 
term the Appellant was then serving. 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
annotated, 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1; Was the hearsay upon which the court relied in 
binding over Appellant reliable hearsay? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW #1; The decision to bind over for trial 
presents a question of law which the Appellate Court reviews 
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for correctness. State v. Rodriquez-Lopi, 954 P. 2d 1290 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
ISSUE #2 : Did the Appellant's attorney act so deficiently that 
it denied the Appellant any resemblance of his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW #2 : Where ineffective assistance of counsel 
is raised for the first time on appeal, the Appellate Court 
must determine as a matter of law whether the Appellant was 
denied effective assistance of counsel. State v. Callahan 866 
P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. VI: In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV, SECTION 1: All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
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States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART, 1, SECTION 7: No person shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART, 1 SECTION 12: In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
Constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: If 
from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall 
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to 
answer to the district court. The findings of probable 
cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. 
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Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired 
by unlawful means are not properly raised at the prelimi-
nary examination. 
Rule 802 , Utah Rules of Evidence: Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence: In a 
preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be 
construed to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay 
evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged with Distribution of a Con-
trolled Substance, a first degree felony, and with Illegal 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a second degree 
felony. Appellant was charged with a first and second degree 
felonies because of the enhancement of the co-defendant's 
house being within 1000 feet of a day care or public facility. 
The enhancements were later dropped, because the State 
attempted to enhance the offences based upon a private rest 
home. 
A preliminary hearing on this matter was held on June 22, 
1998. At this hearing, the court allowed a police officer to 
give hearsay testimony regarding another officer allegedly 
finding a suspect white powder on the Appellant. The court 
bound over the Appellant for trial based upon this hearsay 
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despite the objections of Appellant's counsel that the hearsay 
did not fit a hearsay exception and that the hearsay was not 
reliable as required for the introduction of such hearsay. 
The court gave Appellant's counsel leave to file for the 
court's consideration a memorandum in support of the objection 
to the hearsay, however, counsel failed to do so. 
The trial proceeded on October 16th, 1998 and the Appel-
lant was found guilty of the amended charge of Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. 
Appellant was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of no 
more than five years at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant was originally charged with a first degree 
felony of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance and 
with a second degree felony of Illegal Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance in the First District Court of Box Elder 
County. (Prelim. Trans, p. 32). Appellant was charged with 
a first and second degree felonies because of the enhancement 
of the co-defendant's house being within 1000 feet of a day 
care or public facility. (Prelim. Trans, p. 9). The enhance-
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ments were later dropped, because the State attempted to 
enhance the offences based upon a private rest home. (Trial 
Trans, p. 10). 
At Appellant's Preliminary Hearing, Officer Dennis 
Vincent was allowed over the objection of Appellant's counsel 
to testify that another officer, Officer Gary Gerbich, found 
suspected drugs on Appellant during a weapons search. (Prelim. 
Trans, p. 10). The court allowed the hearsay, however, the 
court also granted Appellant's counsel the opportunity to file 
a memorandum with the court on the topic for further consider-
ation — counsel failed to do so. (Prelim. Trans, p. 32). The 
prosecution actually called Officer Gerbich to testify, 
however, when Officer Gerbich was not immediately located, the 
court decided that the hearsay testimony of Officer Vincent 
was sufficient to bind over the Appellant. (Prelim. Trans, p. 
30) . The prosecution put on no other witness that had any 
personal knowledge of whether or not Appellant had any drugs 
in his possession the night he was arrested. 
The Appellant's trial proceeded on October 16th, 1998. 
The jury found the Appellant guilty of the Third Degree Felony 
of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled substance (Trial 
Trans, p. 243), and the Appellant was sentenced to serve an 
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indeterminate term of not more than five years at the Utah 
State Prison (Sentencing Trans, p. 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Consti-
tution guarantee all persons charged with a criminal offense 
the right to due process of law, the right to confront their 
accusers and the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Despite these constitutionally mandated rights, the Appellant 
was denied (1) the right of due process and the opportunity to 
confront witnesses at his preliminary hearing when he was 
bound over based solely upon unreliable hearsay, and (2) the 
opportunity to have effective assistance of counsel when his 
attorney failed to submit to the court a memorandum regarding 
objectionable hearsay allowed at the preliminary hearing. 
At the preliminary hearing, the court allowed one officer 
not involved in the actual search and arrest of the Appellant 
to testify that another officer had found a suspect powder on 
the Appellant which was later found to be methamphetamine. 
The arresting officer was somewhere in the courthouse during 
the time of the preliminary hearing and was scheduled and 
called to testify, however, when he was not immediately 
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locateable, the court bound over the Appellant based upon the 
above hearsay testimony. The court found this hearsay 
testimony reliable solely because the hearsay declarant was a 
police officer. Because of the nature of their relationship 
to the prosecution and the potential for abuse by the police, 
hearsay evidence should not be found reliable solely upon the 
fact that the declarant is a police officer. 
After allowing the hearsay at the preliminary hearing, 
the court gave leave to Appellant's counsel, Mr. Kevin McGaha, 
to file a memorandum in support of the object with the court 
for further consideration. Counsel failed to do so, despite 
knowing that the hearsay allowed was unreliable and should 
have not have been allowed. By not filing the allowed 
memorandum, Mr. McGaha allowed the hearsay evidence to remain 
and Appellant's bind over to be unchallenged. 
Mr. McGahafs failure to file the allowed memorandum in 
opposition to the hearsay demonstrate a substandard perfor-
mance so deficient that it fell below any reasonable objective 
standard of professional judgment. Mr. McGaha's failure was 
prejudicial to Appellant, and but for Mr. McGaha's ineffective 
assistance, the outcome of the Appellant's trial would have 
been different. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT BOUND OVER 
THE DEFENDED BASED UPON UNRELIABLE HEARSAY ALLOWED DURING 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
guarantee persons charged with criminal offenses the right to 
due process of law and the right to confront witnesses against 
them. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, 
Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art. 1, 
Section 12. These are two primary reasons for Rule 802 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, which generally prohibits the use of 
hearsay evidence at trial and at other criminal proceedings. 
See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. 
At a preliminary hearing, "[if] from the evidence a 
magistrate finds probable cause to believe the crime charged 
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, 
the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court." Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(h)(2). Rule 7(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure continues by providing that in the preliminary examina-
tion, Mt]he findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part." However, the 1994 amendment to 
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article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, requires that 
such hearsay evidence be reliable. see Utah Const, art I, § 
12 (emphasis added) ("Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at preliminary examina-
tion. . . . ") . The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that, MI]n 
a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be 
construed to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(5) emphasis added. Thus, 
although hearsay is admissible in the preliminary examination 
to establish probable cause, it must be reliable. 
Regarding admissibility of reliable hearsay, this Court 
has held that xx v [R] eliability can be inferred without more in 
a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. . .[I]n other cases, the evidence must be excluded 
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness. ' " State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 
App. 1990) quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
Therefore, hearsay is allowed at preliminary hearings and 
the magistrate's finding of probable cause may be based 
partially or entirely upon such hearsay. But, the hearsay 
must be reliable as shown by the determination that the 
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evidence qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rules or 
otherwise has some other particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness. The hearsay evidence presented at Appellant's 
preliminary hearing did not meet the requirements of any 
hearsay exception and, in fact, the prosecution never argued 
that the hearsay was admissible under any exception to the 
hearsay rules. Instead, the prosecution volunteered to lay 
more foundation in order to "present further evidence of 
reliability." (Prelim. Trans, p. 10) . The magistrate allowed 
the prosecution to continue, resulting in the following 
dialogue taken from the Preliminary Hearing Transcript: 
Q: (by Mr. Baron -- prosecution): Officer Vincent, you 
indicated that there was information from the probation 
department? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Do you know which probation officer that would have 
been? 
A: I don't it's not stated here. 
Q: You received your information from whom? Sergeant 
Gerbich? 
A: Correct. 
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Q: And is that in his report, what you've been testifying 
to? 
A: I'm reading off his part of the report, yes. 
Q: And Sergeant Gerbich is presently employed with the 
Brigham City Police Department? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And in the past you've been able to rely upon what he 
says in various cases and investigations? 
A: Yes. 
Q: With regard, then, to Officer Gerbich, tell us what is 
your understanding, understandably through hearsay, as to 
what he did and what he found. . . 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript p. 11 - 12.) 
When the prosecution called Officer Gerbich to the stand, 
he was not found in the vicinity of the courtroom. Although 
Officer Gerbich was at the courthouse earlier and excluded 
from the hearing under the exclusionary rule, Officer Gerbich 
could not be found when he was called to the stand to testify. 
Because Officer Gerbich did not take the stand to testify 
regarding the circumstances surrounding Appellant's search and 
arrest, Appellant had no opportunity to confront Officer 
Gerbich regarding the hearsay evidence presented by Officer 
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Vincent and to elicit testimony that would have shown that 
there was no probable cause for binding him over on the 
possession charges. 
When Mr. McGaha renewed his objection to the hearsay 
evidence after the State rested its case, the prosecution's 
only argument why the hearsay had the required particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness was that, "[Officer Vincent] 
clearly testified that Officer Gerbich has been a member of 
the police department for a number of years. [T]hat [Officer 
Vincent] has had other cases with [Officer Gerbich] where he 
has been reliable. [B]asically then, [Office Vincent] just 
quoted from Officer Gerbich's report about what happened. [I] 
think we do have some reliable hearsay and certainly that 
indicates that the defendant did possess methamphetamine." 
(Prelim. Trans, p. 31). Upon this argument, the magistrate 
allowed the hearsay evidence and bound Appellant over for 
trial on the charges. 
Based upon the above information, the question for this 
Court is whether the sole fact that a hearsay declarant is a 
police officer is sufficient to qualify hearsay statements by 
the officer as having particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness, such as to be reliable hearsay evidence for purposes 
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of finding probable cause at a preliminary hearing. Appellant 
respectfully submits to the Court that establishing such a 
precedent would be contrary to the purposes of the hearsay 
rules — to protect due process and to preserve the confronta-
tion rights of defendants. 
The role of police officers in the criminal justice 
system is that of the State's investigative body, assigned to 
gather facts sufficient to successfully try and convict those 
persons suspected of committing any particular crime. The job 
of the police is to produce evidence sufficient to convince a 
magistrate to bind over the accused and then to assist the 
prosecutor in convincing a fact finder that the accused did in 
fact commit the crime for which he or she stands accused. One 
task officers perform in assisting in the conviction of 
suspects is that of testifying for the prosecution. Because 
officers testify for the prosecution regularly, they typically 
understand the information and facts that they must include in 
their reports to achieve their goals of bindover and convic-
tion. Because of this, some officers may be tempted to leave 
out important facts or to put a spin on the included facts to 
reach the goal of conviction. If any such tainted reports 
were allowed to be used as evidence against the accused 
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without the accused having a chance to cross-examine the 
officer or the officer actually taking the stand and swearing 
to tell the truth, there would be little protection for the 
accused against such creative report writing. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the hearsay allowed 
at the preliminary hearing goes to the key element of the 
charged crime, specifically, whether or not Appellant was in 
possession of a controlled substance the night he was ar-
rested. Appellant was bound over on the charges simply upon 
the fact that Officer Gerbich wrote, for whatever reason, that 
he found drugs on Appellant's person when he searched him that 
night. By allowing this evidence to be presented in the form 
of hearsay testimony, Appellant was denied the opportunity to 
cross-examine his accuser in order to establish any biases 
Officer Gerbich might have had against Appellant and to elicit 
information which might have been missing or potentially 
misleading from Officer Gerbich's report. Because this 
hearsay dealt with the key element of the charge, and Appel-
lant had no opportunity to cross-examine Officer Gerbich on 
the facts surrounding Appellant's search and arrest or the content 
of his report, Appellant had no opportunity at all to show the 
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court that there was no probable cause for binding him over on the 
charges. 
Appellant respectfully submits that because of the potential 
for creative report writing by officers and the danger in allowing 
one officer to simply read in another officer's report, hearsay is 
not reliabl€^  simply because the hearsay declarant is a police 
officer. Because the lower court determined that Officer Gerbich's 
hearsay statements were reliable solely on the fact he was an 
officer and because Officer Gerbich's hearsay testimony is the only 
basis upon which Appellant was bond over, Appellant requests that 
this Court find the lower court erred in binding Appellant over on 
the charges. 
II. THE APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY ACTED SO DEFICIENTLY THAT IT 
DENIED THE APPELLANT ANY RESEMBLANCE OF HIS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Consti-
tution guarantee persons charged with a criminal offense the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to assist in their 
defense. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, 
Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 7; Utah Const. Art. 1, 
Section 12; See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
667 at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
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182 (1990) . The Appellant was denied this constitutionally 
guaranteed right and, therefore, his conviction must be 
reversed* 
The Appellant was denied any resemblance of an effective 
assistance of counsel, in that his first attorney, Mr. Kevin 
McGaha, failed to file a memorandum in opposition to the 
admission of the above discussed hearsay allowed at the 
preliminary hearing even after the court gave him leave to do 
so. 
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the Appellant must show that (1) his counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that there 
exists a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's 
deficient conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable 
to the Appellant. State v. Baker, 963 P. 2d 801, 806 (Utah 
App. 1998 quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578,579 (Utah 
App. 1993) erupting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984) . 
In determining whether counsel's performance was defi-
cient, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
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the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged 
action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578,579 (Utah App. 1993) cgioting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To e s t a b l i s h 
prejudice under the above test, the Appellant must show the 
ubut for the deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable 
probability' that the result would have been different," 
State v. Baker, 963 P.2d at 807 (Utah App 1998), erupting State 
v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 935 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1998) . 
Appellant's counsel, Mr. McGaha's, failed to file a 
memorandum in support of his oral motion to quash bind over 
after unreliable hearsay was allowed at the preliminary 
hearing. As detailed above, the hearsay testimony in question 
is that of one officer testifying to that which he had no 
personal knowledge, specifically the events surrounding the 
search and arrest of the Appellant for possession of a 
controlled substance by another officer. In failing to file a 
memorandum detailing why Officer Vincent's hearsay testimony 
should have been excluded, Mr. McGaha's performance was 
objectively deficient, and, but for this deficient conduct, 
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there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would 
have been more favorable to Appellant. 
In granting Mr. McGaha leave to file a memorandum in 
support of his objection to the hearsay, the court was clearly 
indicating to Mr. McGaha that there was credence to his 
objection and that upon further argument, the court could be 
persuaded to exclude the hearsay evidence. If the hearsay 
evidence had been excluded, then the court would have had no 
basis for binding Appellant over on the charges. The reason 
for this is the prosecution put on no other evidence regarding 
its allegation the Appellant was in possession of a controlled 
substance the night he was arrested. This would certainly 
have resulted in a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been more favorable to Appellant because had he not 
been bound over on the charge, Appellant could not have been 
convicted of the same. 
Admittedly, there is always the chance that the court 
would not have excluded the hearsay testimony even if Mr. 
McGaha had filed a memorandum with the court. However, as 
stated above, the court must have thought there was some 
credence to Appellant's objection or it would not have given 
Mr. McGaha leave to file a memorandum at all. By not filing 
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the memorandum, Mr. McGaha ensured that the court would 
absolutely allow the hearsay evidence, leaving a zero chance 
that the evidence would be excluded. The decision not to file 
the allowed" memorandum in such a situation can by no stretch 
of the imagination be considered "sound trial strategy". 
Because the hearsay was allowed, Appellant was bound over and 
subsequently convicted of the charge. 
After Mr. McGaha so ineffectively represented Appellant 
at the preliminary and pre-trial stage of his prosecution, 
Appellant requested a different attorney. The court appointed 
Mr. Justin Bond to be Appellant's trial attorney at this 
point. 
Mr. Bond did file a motion to quash bindover based upon 
the hearsay testimony allowed at the preliminary hearing, 
however, this motion was denied the morning of the trial. In 
denying the motion Judge Judkins simply stated that "Judge 
Hadfield made a determination that that was reliable hearsay 
at the preliminary hearing." (Trial Trans, p. 11-12). This 
statement clearly shows that Judge Judkins deferred to Judge 
Hadfield's evaluation of the reliability of the hearsay 
testimony. However, as noted above, at the time Judge 
Hadfield allowed the hearsay he had not determined that the 
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hearsay was reliable — he actually was undecided as indicated 
by the fact he gave Mr. McGaha leave to file a memorandum in 
support of his objection to the hearsay. Because of Mr. 
McGaha's failure to file that memorandum in opposition to the 
hearsay, the hearsay was allowed to remain, bindover was not 
quashed and Appellant was convicted at trial of the charge. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this clearly qualifies as 
ineffective assistance of counsel and requests that the Court 
reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's constitutional rights were violated when 
unreliable hearsay was allowed at his preliminary hearing and 
because his attorney acted so deficiently that Appellant was 
denied any resemblance of his constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
The lower court committed error when it found that 
hearsay evidence offered at Appellant's preliminary hearing 
was reliable hearsay based solely upon the fact that the 
declarant was a police officer. Because of police officers' 
relationship with the prosecution and their role as the 
State's investigative unit, statements by police officers 
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should not be viewed as reliable solely based upon the 
declarant's status as a police officer. Such a precedent might 
encourage some officers to either fail to provide in their 
reports information damaging to the prosecution or to slant 
the contents of their reports to be favorable to the prosecu-
tion. 
After the lower court gave counsel leave to submit a 
memorandum explaining why such hearsay by officers was not 
reliable, counsel's failure to submit such a memorandum denied 
Appellant the effective assistance of counsel. Counsel's 
decision to not submit a memorandum could not be considered 
sound trial strategy in that by allowing the memorandum, the 
court was indicating that it had made no final determination 
regarding the admissibility of the hearsay. 
Counsel's failure was prejudicial to the Appellant in 
that had counsel submitted the memorandum, the lower court 
could have determined the hearsay to be unreliable and 
inadmissible. Because the only evidence upon which the court 
could find probable cause for bindover was the hearsay 
testimony, had the hearsay been excluded, Appellant would not 
have been bound over on the charges. For the foregoing 
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reasons, Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ a day of November, 1999 
Richard, 
Attorn 
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I hereby certify that I hand-delivered two true 
correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief to: 
Christine Soltis 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
day of November, 1999. 
and 
Dated this 7~ 
Richar 
Attorn 
llegos 
or Appellant 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH FILED 
Mfiv n g /iggo; .f.'t 15 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL HERRERA 
Defendant. 
COURT OF APPALS 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER °' ^ 
OF PROBATION - = 
Case No. 981100180 C3 
On the 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1998, appeared John D. Sorge, Box 
Elder County Attorney, representing the State of Utah, and the defendant 
appeared in person and represented by counsel, Justin C. Bond. 
No legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be 
pronounced, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant is convicted of: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, and defendant shall serve a term not to exceed 5 YEARS IN THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON, said prison term to be consecutive with defendant's 
existing prison sentence. 
The Court reserves the right to reevaluate the sentence after receiving 
the presentence investigation report. Defendant may also file a written 
request to reevaluate his sentence after the presetence investigation report is 
received. 
0£>'"ft 
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and further orders as 
it may deem necessary from time to time. 
DATED this ^ day of _ c J j ^ _ .19J^ 
( # £ O F / ^ s BY THE COURT: 
&:~M 
ATTEST: 
COURT CLERK 
by JYatAjC^ 3fWwt^O 
Deputy'Clerk 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that madod a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION TO Justin C. Bond, Attorney for 
Defendant, P.O. Box 895, Brigham City, UT 84302, postage prepaid, this 
/T^ day of _ V - / H 1999. 
* / 
2 
